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Antitrust Policy: The Impact of Revenue Penalties on Price
This short paper suggests that’s a firm’s behavior can be affected by the credible threat of intervention by antitrust authorities, as well as by such intervention itself.  This credible threat of intervention can take the form of simple regulatory rules, which impact upon a firm’s pricing strategy.1  The desirability of rules-based antitrust policies has been discussed by Christiansen and Kerber (2006).  The notion of threats impacting upon firms’ behavior has far reaching consequences.  While the model below focuses on the threat of intervention by antitrust authorities, it is arguably applicable to the potential regulation of a firm by an industry-specific regulator.

For a broad class of potential revenue penalties, we find that the threat of intervention impacts upon a firm’s pricing strategy.  However, in an example reflecting the 1998 UK Competition Act, we find that penalties that increase linearly with profits made may not significantly impact upon a firm’s pricing policy, although revenue penalties that increase non-linearly with profits are found to have a significant effect on price.  Similarly, we explore the implications of the probability of an antitrust intervention increasing non-linearly as profits increase.  These results are potentially significant as Souam (2001) concludes that the French system of penalties that (at the time of his writing) took the form of 5% of revenue have a limited collusion deterring effect.  However, it should be noted that Souam’s model is very different to that developed in this paper, assuming for example, that firms set quantity rather than price.  Parallels may also be drawn with fines imposed under US antitrust law and EC competition policy.

The ability of threatened interventions to affect firms’ behavior is desirable, given that antitrust interventions are typically costly and complicated.  However, it should be noted that the intervention considered in this paper is not intended to be optimal and hence does not reflect the maximization of a regulatory objective function.  Rather, the example used in the paper highlights how threatened revenue penalties that may be relatively straightforward to calculate can significantly affect a firm’s price.  This is arguably an important benefit given the complex nature of antitrust investigations.  Nevertheless, conditions are also outlined that would ensure that a firm’s price equals marginal cost when faced with a threat of antitrust intervention.  

While the notion of competition and regulatory policies impacting upon firms’ strategy choices is not new, only a relatively small amount of work has focused specifically on the impact of threatened interventions on firms’ behavior.  In addition, much of the existing theoretical literature focuses on the threat of industry specific regulation, including papers by Klevorick (1973), Bawa and Sibley (1980) and Logan et al. (1989), which conclude that the threat of regulation can impinge upon a firm’s behavior.2  These papers focus on regulation (and the threat of regulation) in monopolistic industries, where regulation is used to achieve a ‘fair rate-of-return’, reflecting rate-of-return regulation traditionally adopted in the US.  Alternatively, Glazer and Macmillan (1992) examine the threat of having a price selected by the regulator imposed upon a monopolist.  However, recent work by Harrington Jr. (2003, 2004, 2005) looks at the dynamic price trajectories of cartel members in the faced of fixed fines for abuse of antitrust laws, this work building on the static model of Block et al. (1981).3

The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 sets out the assumptions underlying the general theoretical model.  Section 3 describes the results of antitrust authorities threatening to impose revenue penalties for abuse of a dominant market position.  Given that the provisions of the 1998 UK Competition Act only came into force in March 2000 it still remains pertinent in Section 4 to illustrate possible implications of the threats contained in that legislation, and alternatives to the legislation adopted.  Section 5 concludes.  

2.  Assumptions
Assume that a risk neutral firm with sufficient market power to be considered a monopolist (or joint profit maximizing oligopolists) wishes to set price to maximize profits in a single period game.  However, suppose antitrust authorities can monitor the profits made by the firm and can choose to impose a revenue penalty if it is believed that the level of profits suggests that the firm is abusing its market position.  Given the legal requirement on most firms to report profits, information on profits should be readily available to an antitrust body.  Yet, reflecting in part the imperfect and costly nature of regulation and regulatory monitoring, intervention by the antitrust authorities may not necessarily be certain, even when profits are high.  Rather, the probability of intervention is, similarly, positively related to the level of profits made.  ‘Equal treatment under the law’ implies that antitrust authorities should intervene in all comparable cases when profits are found to be excessive.  Hence, it should be noted that in this model the probability of intervention increasing with profits reflects the difficulties facing antitrust authorities in identifying abuses of market power, and the greater likelihood that market power abuses will be detected when profits are higher (and given the visibility of profits for many firms), rather than any choice made not to intervene once profits have been deemed excessive.

Throughout the paper it is assumed that:

where:
 = probability of regulatory intervention, twice continuously differentiable;
 = profits in the absence of regulatory intervention;
P = price;
c = average costs of production;
q = output;
; twice continuously differentiable.

Also, a potential penalty on revenue is denoted .  It is similarly assumed that:

and that  is again twice continuously differentiable.  Assuming that the magnitude of revenue penalties is a function of a firm’s profits gives rise to the risk of the ‘Averch-Johnson’ effect, whereby a firm may artificially increase costs to avoid a revenue penalty.  This clearly increases the informational requirements of the regulator, although it may be hoped that for many firms the discipline of the stock market will curb any tendency to artificially increase cost expenditures.  An alternative would be to assume that the revenue penalty is a function of a firm’s price, noting that in 2001 the Office of Fair Trading fined a pharmaceutical company, Napp, for charging ‘excessive prices’ to community users of a drug, decision CA98/2/2001.  However, typically, antitrust authorities do not intervene when it is believed that a firm’s price is in some way ‘excessive’, and the policy of penalizing ‘excessive’ prices has been criticized, see Evans and Padilla (2005).
 
Fixed costs of production are assumed to equal zero.4  To maintain the generality of the analysis, linear variable cost and demand functions are not necessarily assumed, rather it being assumed that:

where:
C = total costs of production;
and both of the above functions are twice continuously differentiable.

3. Revenue Penalties
A firm maximizes the following profit function:
									(1)
It is straightforward to confirm that when Equation (1) is maximized, price will be:
						(2)
The second order condition required to ensure that profits are maximized is stated in the Appendix.  Although not required for any of the results derived below, a range of constraints on the upper limit of  can be envisaged, for example the antitrust authorities may try to ensure that a firm at least makes non-negative profits.

Note that in the absence of a threat of regulatory intervention, a firm would maximize the following profit function:
										(3)
giving rise to the profit maximizing price:
										(4)
it being straightforward to confirm that profits are indeed maximized at this price.  A comparison of the expressions for price in Equations (2) and (4) indicates that price can be expected to be lower in the face of a possible revenue penalty.  This reflects the firm’s concern that a higher price will give rise to greater profits, but higher profits are associated with a greater likelihood of an antitrust investigation and a revenue penalty.

Although the form of regulatory intervention envisaged is not intended to be optimal, it is obvious that to ensure a first-best scenario under regulation, i.e. where price is equal to marginal cost, any penalty should satisfy the following condition:
								(5)
The condition in Equation (5) can be interpreted as the expected impact of regulatory intervention should be equated with the extent to which a firm increases price above marginal cost in the absence of regulation.

For comparison purposes, three alternative regulatory scenarios can be envisaged in which the earlier assumptions regarding  and  are changed:
i)	A certain, fixed penalty:
;			
i.e. price is (unsurprisingly) the monopoly price of Equation (4).
ii)	A fixed penalty, applied with probability :
;			
If the condition below is satisfied then price, in the face of threatened regulation, will be equal to marginal cost.





ensuring that price is equal to marginal cost.

4. A 1998 UK Competition Act Example
The model above can be used to explore the potential effectiveness of the 1998 UK Competition Act.  This act contains the provision whereby firms can be fined a maximum of 10% of turnover for three years.  As yet there are relatively few instances of fines being imposed.  However, there have been some well-publicized cases, including price-fixing in the replica football shirt market (Office of Fair Trading decision CA98/06/2003) and the distribution of toys (Office of Fair Trading decision CA98/18/2002).  In both cases fines were imposed, with the starting point for the calculation of fines being 10% of the appropriate firm turnover.  This section explores the impact on a firm’s pricing strategy of such a fine, also considering the impact of the possible imposition of a fine that increases non-linearly with profits made.

To maintain the tractability of the analysis it is assumed that the inverse demand function takes the following form:
    
and variable costs of production are set equal to zero.  Hence, in the absence of any threat of antitrust intervention, the profit maximizing monopoly price will be  and .  It is initially assumed that the maximum fine under the Act in any one year is imposed, namely:
										(6)
as this has been the starting point for Office of Fair Trading fine calculations.  It is difficult to select a specific functional form for the probability of antitrust intervention , but at the outset it is assumed that
											(7)
where:
	= monopoly profits in the absence of any threat of antitrust intervention.
This seems intuitive, as the probability of intervention will approach unity as the firm’s profits approach the level of profit maximizing profits in the absence of a regulatory threat.  However, it can be proved that under these assumptions relating to the forms of  and , the threat of antitrust intervention has no effect on a firm’s pricing strategy, and it will set .5  This result also attains when a three year revenue penalty is imposed, i.e. the maximum that the Office of Fair Trading can impose.

Employing a linearly increasing functional form for  such as that discussed above has been found to have no impact on the firm’s pricing strategy so a non-linearly increasing functional form is also considered, specifically whereby the penalty increases at an increasing rate as profits rise.  Hence,
											(8)
is used as this ensures that the revenue penalty not only increases at an increasing rate, but that it is equal to the firm’s total revenue and profits when .  If
 and  
are adopted, then the profit-maximizing level of price falls significantly to , i.e. the use of a non-linearly increasing functional form for  imposes a significant downward pressure on a firm’s price, although price does not fall to zero, the level of marginal cost and so also the first-best solution.  Nevertheless, this is to be expected from a regulatory regime that is not intended to be optimal but rather suggested for the relative simplicity of its rules.  

The assumption that 
 
is then maintained, but in addition it is assumed that 
 											(9)
as  when , and again the function increases at an increasing rate as profits rise.  It can then be shown that the profit-maximizing price will be . 

It is interesting to note that if it is assumed that 
 and  
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